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RECENT DECISIONS
BAILMENTs-DuTY oF BAiLE Tro BAILoR-BAnLES SETTNG UP ADvF sE CLAi!
IN CnxrEL.-A rented a "horse-racing" starting gate, his own invention, to B
for the season. At the end of the season, with B's consent, the gate was left
on B's property. C, a creditor of A, began action against A, a non-resident, by
publication, and issued a writ of garnishment against B. B answered that it had
in its possession the gate belonging to A. Judgment by default was rendered
against A. A month later the gate was sold by the sheriff for $89 to an employee
of B. B had the gate at the time of the tender hy A and at the time of the
trial. A sought to set aside the judgment and sale. It was disclosed at the trial
that A had no permanent address, that the gate was worth about $2500, that B
had tried to notify A of the garnishment proceedings, and that A had tendered
to B the amount of the judgment, interest and costs. By the time of the trial
B was also demanding the costs of repairs since made on the gate. The trial
court dismissed the action. On appeal, held, judgment affirmed. Puett v. Bern-
hard, (Wash. 1937) 71 P. (2) 406.
It is stated as a general rule that a bailee is estopped to deny the bailor's
title. Pulliam v. Burlingame, 81 Mo. 111, 51 Am. Rep. 229 (1883). The bailee
must return the chattel to the bailor before he can assert an adverse claim.
Blackorby v. Friend, 134 Minn. 1, 158 N.W. 708 (1916); Nudd v. Montayne, 38
Wis. 511, 20 Am. Rep. 25 (1875). An exception to the above rule has been
recognized; where the bailee has given the goods to an adverse claimant, he
can defend an action against him by the bailor by showing that such claimant
was the true owner. Abasi Bros. v. Louisville & N. R. Co., 115 Miss. 803,
76 So. 665 (1917); Yokohama Specie Bank v. Geo. Bush & Co., 121 Wash.
272, 209 Pac. 676, 212 Pac. 583 (1922). When money, goods, or other chattels
are deposited with a bailee for safekeeping they may at any time be subjected
to attachment or garnishment by a creditor of the bailor. Cooley v. Minn. Trans-
fer R. Co., 53 Minn. 332, 55 N.W. 141 (1893). This relieves the bailee from
liability provided he has given sufficient and prompt notice of such legal process
to the bailor. Auierican Exp. Co. v. Mullins, 212 U.S. 311, 29 Sup. Ct. 381, 53
L.ed. 525 (1909); Indiana, I. & L R. Co. v. Doreweyer, 20 Ind. App. 611, 50
N.E. 497 (1898); Ohio & M. R. Co. v. Yohe, 51 Ind. 181, 19 Am. Rep. 727
(1875); Jewett v. Olsen, 18 Or. 421, 23 Pac. 262, (1890); Henderson v.
Hooper Sugar Co., 65 Utah 241, 236 Pac. 239, 45 A.L.R. 637 (1925). The bailee
must also use his knowledge of the facts in determining whether the property
is that of the debtor. Branch v. Bekins Van & Storage Co., 106 Cal. App. 623,
290 Pac. 146 (1930). Where the property is seized by a creditor of the bailee the
bailee must account to the bailor. Love v. People's Compress Co., 137 Miss. 622,
102 So. 275 (1924). Where the bailee has some possessory right by virtue of the
bailment, e.g. a lease, which he may assert against the bailor, this right will
be protected as against legal process instigated by creditors of the bailor. Noel v.
Cowan, 80 Mont. 258, 260 Pac. 116 (1927); Dixon v. White Sewing Machine Co.,
128 Pa. 397, 18 Atl. 502 (1889); Smith v. Niles, 20 Vt. 315, 49 Am. Dec. 782
(1848).
In the instant case the bailor had tendered to the bailee the amount of the
judgment with interest and costs. It is submitted that the bailor's attempt to
have the judgment and sale set aside was ill advised. The service by publication
was effective to give the Washington court power to act against the bailor and
to cause the judgment to be satisfied out of the property seized. The bailee had
tried to notify the bailor. And the bailee was under no duty to save the gate
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from the sale. Here, however, the bailee, did buy in through its employee.
Whether a bailee is a "fiduciary" may be an academic inquiry [see Exton & Co.
v. Home Ins. Co., 249 N.Y. 258, 164 N.E. 43 (1928), Doyle v. Murphy, 22 Ill.
502, 74 Am. Dec. 165 (1895) and Sindlinger v. Dept. of Financial Inst., (Ind.
1936) 199 N.E. 715] but a bailee is not a stranger to the bailor. If he does pro-
tect the bailor's goods by saving them from the sale, or by buying in after the
sale, he should be reimbursed for what he is out of pocket, and he should
have a lien in the chattel to secure his claim, but that should be the extent
of his interest. With the instant case compare Enos v. Cole, 53 Wis. 235, 10 N.W.
377 (1881). In that case the defendant sheriff had seized the bailor's chattel
and had sold it to enforce a tax warrant issued against the bailee. The bailee
had bought in at the sale to protect the chattel. Thereafter the bailor sued the
sheriff for a conversion of the chattel and the action was dismissed. The court
pointed out that the bailee was not in default on his contract with the bailor.
The bailor was not hurt by the defendant's conduct. Nor could the bailee in that
case charge the bailor with the expense of the saving.
HOWARD W. ESLIEN.
BANKS AND BANKING-STOCKHOLDERS' ADDED LIABILITY-LIABILITY OF Suc-
CESSIm HoLDERs OF THE SAME SHARE.-Rose Hunt Taylor, one of the appel-
lants, owned six shares of the capital stock of the Peoples State Bank of Ram-
sey. In January of 1930 her husband was elected a director of the bank. He
owned only four shares of stock, and in order to enable him to qualify as a
director, she assigned to him the six shares owned by her. It was agreed between
them that the stock would be returned to her as soon as the husband could
secure other shares. Two months later the husband did secure six shares of
stock and had the newly acquired shares regularly transferred on the bank's
stock records to his wife. In February, 1931, the bank was closed and a receiver
was appointed. The receiver began an action to enforce the superadded liability
of the stockholders. The par value of the stock was $100 per share. Mrs. Taylor
had paid $600, the amount assessed on the six shares she owned at the time the
bank closed, but she contested an assessment of an equal sum on the stocks
which she assigned to her husband. The only issue was whether the successive
holding of six shares, by a stockholder, imposes a greater liability than a con-
tinuous holding of the same number of shares. The appellate court reversed the
decree of the trial court which had found for the defendant. On appeal, held,
judgment of the appellate court affirmed. The assessment for double liability of
stockholders of a bank can be made against all stock held by the stockholder.
Identity in the number of shares owned is not equivalent to identity of the stock
ownership. Each separate holding subjects the holder to an assessment for liabil-
ity of the bank incurred during the holding of such stock. Bombal v. Peoples
State Bank of Ramsey, (IIl. 1937) 10 N.E. (2d) 651.
The Illinois constitution provides that every state bank shareholder shall be
liable, to an amount equal to the par value of his share of stock, for all liabili-
ties accruing to the bank while he remains a stockholder. And since the statute
of limitations does not begin to run until the cause of action arises, the holder
of stock in an Illinois state bank may be held liable several years after he has
sold his stock. Successive owners of the same share of stock may each be held
liable to the amount of the par value of the stock for losses accruing during
their respective ownership of the same stock. Sanders v. Merchant's State Bank,
349 Ill. 547, 182 N.E. 897 (1932). Under the Illinois rule enforcement of the
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